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Abstract: Cooperation and trust between Russia and the European Union (EU), two of the most 
important  international  actors,  have  reached  the  lowest  level  since  the  Cold  War.  The  main  bone  of 
contention has been the future of countries situated in Eastern Europe, in the so-called ‘in-between’/’buffer’ 
region. On the one hand, the EU aims at strengthening links with the six Eastern European partners  – 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – by encouraging reforms and by luring them 
to embrace European core values. However, Russia’s counteractions have mitigated the EU’s plans towards 
its vicinity - as the case of Ukraine best points out. Apart from the geopolitical competition over the ‘shared’ 
neighbourhood,  the  EU-Russia  relation  has  started  to  depend  heavily  on  the  energy  issues  further 
complicating the already complex background. Russia uses the energy card as tool to influence the shape of 
the  regional  context,  whereas  the  EU  responds  with  a  superior  technological  advantage  and  a  more 
attractive economic and political agenda. Having this a backdrop, this paper aims to underline that a clear 
competition between the two players exists, fomented by a fundamental ideological difference in perceiving 
the outside world. 
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1. EU  AND  RUSSIA  AS  INTERNATIONAL  ACTORS:  A  THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
The  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  end  of  the  bipolar  world,  and  the  beginning  of  an  era 
characterized by multilateralism, meant a new stage in the international relations. The violent burst 
that soon came after in the form of the Balkan civil war has remembered to the European Union 
(EU) that the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of communist regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe would leave this territory uncontained and unsecure. With its new neighbour at the 
east, Russia, left weak after a long ideological war, the EU felt it its duty to “take over”, to create 
stability and security in the region, mainly through cooperation and interdependence. 
The EU felt it necessary at this point to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(through the Treaty of Maastricht), policy reinforced in time by a Common Security and Defence 
Policy  (1999).  In  Eastern  Europe,  the  European  Neighbourhood  Policy  (2004)  and  the  Eastern 
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Partnership  Initiative  (2008),  have  been  seen  as  alternatives  to  the  enlargement  strategy,  even 
though not officially stated (Moga, Alexeev, 2013, p. 41). With the end of the Cold War came for 
the EU the possibility of applying outside its borders the model of integration that brought peace 
and prosperity to the Western European countries after the Second World War. Thus, Brussels tried 
to bring stability and security to this region through „a liberal security perspective of normative 
transformation based on the EU’s core values – democratization, rule of law, human rights, market 
economy” (Moga et. al. 2013, p. 42). The EU started to impose itself as a civilian and a normative 
power at both the regional level, and the international level.  
Being a civilian power entails non-military actions and it includes economic, diplomatic and 
cultural policy instruments (Smith, 2005, p. 1). It does not entail only the means that are being used, 
but also the ends that are being pursued by the actor (Smith, 2005, p. 2). Fran￧ois Duchȇne (1973, p. 
20) argued that “the European Community will only make the most of its opportunities if it remains 
true to  its  inner characteristics (…) primarily  civilian ends  and means, and  a built-in  sense of 
collective action, which in turn express, however imperfectly, social values of equality, justice and 
tolerance.” On the other hand, Hans Maull, argues (2002, p. 19) that “civilian powers concentrate 
on non-military, primarily economic, means to secure goals, but retain military power to safeguard 
other means of international interaction.” Duchȇne’s argument is to be better observed in the lights 
of the current relationship of the EU with the partner states – Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan – under the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative. Even though the civilian 
means and ends have remained intact, the “built-in sense of collective action” has been altered 
especially through the different views between the member states on the role of the EU and the 
relationship that it should have with these countries, and subsequently with Russia, and through the 
different definition that the concept of ‘partnership’ has for the EU and for the ‘partner’ countries, 
deteriorating the sense of “equality, justice, and tolerance” meant as shared values. 
Manners, in his study on Europe’s normative power (2002, p. 239), proceeds from the ideas 
of Carr (1962, p. 108), Duchȇne (1973, p. 2, 7), and Galtung (1973, p. 33). On the one hand, Carr 
makes the distinction between economic power, military power, and power over opinion. Moreover, 
Duchȇne sees the European Community as an ‘id￩e force’, starting with the beliefs of the ‘founding 
fathers’  and  extending  through  its  appeal  to  widely  different  political  temperaments.  Finally, 
Galtung believes that “ideological power is the power of ideas” and that it is “powerful because the 
power-sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient through the media of 
culture.” After assessing these arguments, Manners points out that “one of the problems with the 
notions of civilian and military power is their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the  
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EU looks.” Hence, in order to understand the ways on which EU is acting and the strength of its 
normative power, we should first understand the characteristics of its international identity that 
come  from  its  historical  context,  its  hybrid  polity  (supranational  and  international  forms  of 
governance), and its legal constitution (elite-driven, treaty-based, legal order) (Manners, 2002, p. 
240). All of these characteristics have driven the EU to placing universal principles and norms at 
the centre of its relations with its member states (Merlingen et. al., 2001) and the world (Clapham, 
1999:  Smith,  2001),  maybe  in  a  way  of  legitimizing  its  own  existence  and  its  new  form  of 
international actor. A general definition of the concept of ‘normative power’ is provided in the 
paper of Laïdi (2008, p.1): “a power of which the identity and strategy is grounded on a preference 
for a ruled-based system which has three essential characteristics – to have been negotiated and not 
imposed; to have been legitimized equally by international bodies; and to be enforceable on all 
actors of the international system notwithstanding their rank within it.” 
Russia, on the other hand, seems to be following a more realist approach. The relationship 
between Russia and the EU after the Cold War has been dominated by geostrategic changes, and the 
policy responses (rather reactive than planned strategies) of the EU to the political changes in post-
1991 Russia can be viewed in three overlapping stages (Hughes, 2006, p. 2). The first of these 
stages consists in the immediate post-1991 period, “on the basis of a conceptual re-division of the 
post-communist Europe”, EU decoupling the Central and Eastern Europe countries, regarded as 
likely candidates and who were given aid and integration, and the Former Soviet Union states and 
Russia, in a relationship based on aid and cooperation (Hughes, 2006, p. 2). The second stage 
begins from 1994, when EU emphasizes on ‘partnership’ with Russia, especially because of its 
growing energetic dependency on the eastern neighbour, developing new instruments – Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement in 1994, the Common Strategy in 1999 (Hughes, 2006, p. 2). The third 
stage, which begins from 2000, founds a more assertive Russian leadership and an EU with internal 
conflicts between the ‘old’ member states and the ‘new’ member states (Hughes, 2006, p. 2). 
The realist political view considers that the states are the dominant actors in global politics, 
that force is a usable instrument in politics, and even an efficient one, and that military security is of 
very  first  importance  when  it  comes  to  global  politics  (Keohane  and  Nye,  2009,  p.  67). 
Furthermore, political integration between states is reduced and it lasts as long as it serves the 
national interests of the more powerful states, transnational actors are not important from a political 
perspectives or they do not even exist, and only the use of force or threatening of using force allows 
the states  to  survive, the system  remaining  steady  as  long  as  statesmen succeed  to  adapt  their 
interests, as in a balance of power (Keohane et.al., 2009, p. 68).  
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The fact that Russia considers the states as dominant actors in global politics can be further 
observed in its relationship towards EU. Russia discusses with the EU representatives on one hand, 
and with the officials of the member states with who it has shared interests on the other. Russia 
takes advantage of the drift that appeared between the EU member states on the basis of political 
integration, enlargement policy, and most importantly the approach towards Russia. Mark Leonard 
and Nicu Popescu (2007, p. 2) distinguish five policy approaches to Russia among the member 
states. The first are the ‘Trojan Horses’ (Cyprus and Greece), “who often defend Russian interests 
in the EU system, and are willing to veto common EU positions”. Secondly, there are the ‘Strategic 
Partners’ (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), “who enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with Russia which 
occasionally  undermines  common  EU  policies”.  Thirdly,  the  ‘Friendly  Pragmatists’  (Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia) “maintain 
a close relationship  with  Russia and tend to put  their business  interests above political  goals”. 
Fourthly,  the  ‘Frosty  Pragmatists’  (Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  Ireland,  Latvia, 
Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, United Kingdom), “focus on business interests bur are less afraid 
than others to speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues”. Finally, the 
‘New  Cold  Warriors’  (Lithuania  and  Poland),  “who  have  an  overtly  hostile  relationship  with 
Moscow and are willing to use the veto to block EU negotiations with Russia.” 
The other aspects of the realist theory can be observed in Russia’s foreign policy actions. 
Russia promoted its image of an ‘imperfect democracy’, lobbying for the prioritization of pragmatic 
interests over liberal values (Moshes, 2009, p. 2). In addition, Moscow learned how to use the legal 
frame in its advantage, selecting only the agreements that suits her, and not the whole body, thus 
circumventing Brussels by exploiting the bilateral ties (Moshes, 2009, p. 3). 
The main distinction of the two international actors is that “the EU stands for an idea of order 
based on consensus, interdependence and rule of law, while Russian foreign policy is motivated by 
a quest for power, independence and control” (Leonard and Popescu, 2007, p. 8). The fundamental 
theories for the foreign policies of the two actors, Russia and EU, are clearly different. Russia 
exploits the fact that the EU can make use of military force only as last resort, which buys Russia 
enough  time  to  tangle  the  situation  in  its  benefit.  In  this  case,  it  is  not  a  competition,  nor  a 
symbiosis, it is a clash. 
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2. THE CRIMEAN DEBACLE. THE END OF THE EU IDEALISM? 
 
From 2008, Moscow’s approach is a more pragmatic one, and its current foreign policy is 
‘sovereignization’, the consolidation of power at home (Trenin, Lipman, Malashenko, 2013, p. 10). 
What does ‘home’ mean at this moment for Russia, when clearly it has overpassed its borders? 
Putin sees a world with the Russian community at its centre, in a form of concentric circles, all 
starting from Russia and Ukraine at the middle, followed by Belarus, and so on (Menkiszak, 2014, 
p.1). The ‘Russia and Ukraine’ formula is explained in Putin’s discourse from 18 March, after the 
annexation  of  Crimea,  by  the  argument  that  they  are  ”one  people”  and  that  they  ”cannot  live 
without each other.” Russia sees itself as a defender of the Russian-speaking communities and their 
rights, the West being an enemy characterized by moral decline, who wants to stop the Russian 
world from gaining its unity (Menkiszak, 2014, p. 2). 
Russia, who has now regained its strength and, more importantly, its confidence, is trying also 
to regain its influence in the region by annexing territories that it can use as leverage whenever it 
wants and as long as it wants (Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, 
Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, and Crimea in Ukraine). The fact that Russia maintains good 
neighbourly relations in order to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of the post-
Soviet states (Menkiszak, 2014, p. 1) can be observed in the case of Belarus, which has even 
accepted to be a part of the Eurasian Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Union is built as an 
alternative to the European integration for the post-Soviet states. Even though it contains the word 
‘economic’ in its title, this union has the basis of a spiritual and civilizational community, the 
‘Russian world’, formed by “Russian-speaking people centred around Russia, who identify with the 
Orthodox Christian religion and culture and cherish the same shared values, irrespective of their 
citizenship or ethnic background” (Menkiszak, 2014, p. 2).  
Russia  has  succeeded  in  the  years  that  followed  Putin’s  coming  to  power  to  exploit  the 
weaknesses of the international actors as a whole, and those of the EU in particular.  
Firstly, Russia affirms that the West, especially the United States, “violates the international 
law,  employs  a  policy  of  force,  and  pursues  an  effectively  neo-colonial  approach  in  order  to 
strengthen their geopolitical position” (Menkiszak, 2014, p. 2), this being exactly what Putin did in 
Crimea. 
Secondly, Russia has took advantage of the political handicap that EU suffers from – not 
being a state. Laïdi (2008, p. 2) affirmed that “norms are killing politics”, that “they appear less 
legitimate than national political decisions”. Moscow uses its strong cultural and historical links  
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with the EaP countries, reinforced by strong, and with short -time effect, economic incentives in 
order to maintain an equal balance of power. Putin neither wants to win, nor to lose more than he 
has already had. In response to these Russian actions, the EU has begun to combine the preference 
for norms with realpolitik in order to further its interests (Laïdi, 2008, a), but this new approach has 
appeared from a strategic necessity or from a need to satisfy the member states’ different visions? If 
it comes from a strategic necessity, then the EU can say it has made a step forward the political 
integration, but if it is a way to satisfy the member states’ different views, then Russia will certainly 
spot this weakness and exploit it even further that it has already done. Moreover, the need for EU’s 
realpolitik  approach  can  come  from  EU’s  inability  to  foresee  Russia’s  strong  economic,  and 
political, recovery and from the strong belief that the end of the Cold War would mean “living in a 
world in which traditional conflicts between states were on the wane, giving way to a logic of 
interdependence that would call for governance by norms” (Laïdi and Lamy, 2002). 
Thirdly, Russia is emerging as an “ideological alternative to the EU that offers a different 
approach to sovereignty, power and world order” (Leonard et. al., 2007, p. 8) and it is not afraid 
anymore that the ENP/EaP dyad will erode its influence (Leonard et.  al., 2007, p. 13), mainly 
because it believes, through Gleb Pavlovsky’s affirmation, that “the EU provoked and supported 
colored revolutions but failed to manage the consequences. Just look at the mess in Serbia and 
Ukraine” (Leonard et. al., 2007, p. 13).  
In addition, Moscow exploits the image of ‘the victim’. On one hand, it deliberately portrays 
itself  as  a  ‘victim’  of  the  West,  who  has  been  neglected  for  two  decades  while  the  Occident 
continued to rewrite the rules that govern their relationship (Leonard et. al., 2007, p. 19) – NATO 
and  EU  enlargement,  the  plans  for  partial  and  ballistic  missiles  shield in  Europe,  the  new  US 
military bases in Europe, and the Kosovo campaign. On the other hand, it depicts its neighbours as 
‘victims’, as ‘collateral damages’ for the West always seeking to maximize its benefits. 
For Russia, its relationship with the EU is based on competition, Russia revealing itself as an 
antithesis  of  the  EU.  It  aims  to  represent  for  its  neighbours  from  Eastern  Europe  and  South 
Caucasus, all that EU is not – a true partner. At this moment, victories are seen as a survival 
strategy (Leonard et. al., 2007, p. 12) and Putin’s situation is composed as to riding a bicycle: 
unless he carries on peddling, he will fall over (Leonard et.  al.,  2007, p. 12). For the EU, its 
relationship with Russia is a symbiosis, because it needs Russia in order to being able to have the 
effect and the result it seeks in the Eastern neighbourhood, which cannot happen without Russia’s 
consent.   
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The  relationship  between  Russia  and  the  European  Union  is  not  a  symbiosis,  neither  a 
competition per se. Each part of the relationship sees it as it wants and sets its own playing rules. 
We can call it an ‘asymmetric interdependence’ (Hughes, 2006), “a relationship that is shaped on 
both  sides  by  calculated  utility  and  norms,  by  logics  of  consequences  and  appropriateness” 
(Hughes, 2006, p.1). In the end, the EU fails to change Russia, but Russia is certainly changing the 
EU  (Leonard  et.  al.,  2007,  p.  26)  by  blocking  European  objectives,  by  refusing  to  accept  the 
European norms, and by passing off Brussels’ authority. 
 
3.HARD POWER VS. SOFT POWER. RUSSIA VS. THE EU 
 
3.1 Energy 
 
It is a known fact that the EU is not in the position to provide enough energy from its own 
sources, the 28 member states being forced to import oil or gas from other areas, which makes them 
extremely vulnerable and dependable1. The highest share of these imports originates from Russia, 
whose disputes with the so-called transit countries, are threatening to disturb the normal provision, 
like it happened in 2009. The EU-Russia relations have a major importance for both players, but 
when one actor uses these commercial and strategic ties as leverage for influence, then it becomes 
unstable and dangerous for the other side. Russia takes advantage of the energy card, willingly 
knowing that EU member states are strongly dependent on its oil and, especially, gas supplies. 
 
   
                                                 
1Currently, EU countries import 54.1% of their need (Eurostat, 2012, p.29).  
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Table 1 - EU dependence on Russian natural gas 
EU Energy Consumption of Russian Natural Gas 
Country  Primary Energy  Natural Gas 
Austria  12.8%  52.2% 
Belgium  10.9%  43.2% 
Bulgaria  13.6%  100.0% 
Croatia  9.4%  37.1% 
Cyprus  0.0%  0.0% 
Czech Republic  14.2%  80.5% 
Denmark  0.0%  0.0% 
Estonia  10.0%  100.0% 
Finland  10.6%  100.0% 
France  2.7%  17.2% 
Germany  8.7%  39.9% 
Greece  7.2%  54.8% 
Hungary  19.7%  49.5% 
Ireland  0.0%  0.0% 
Italy  7.5%  19.8% 
Latvia  31.0%  100.0% 
Lithuania  50.0%  100.0% 
Luxembourg  6.1%  27.9% 
Malta  0.0%  0.0% 
Netherlands  2.1%  5.8% 
Poland  8.3%  54.2% 
Portugal  0.0%  0.0% 
Romania  8.8%  24.2% 
Slovakia  20.3%  63.3% 
Slovenia  6.3%  57.4% 
Spain  0.0%  0.0% 
Sweden  1.9%  100.0% 
United Kingdom  0.0%  0.0% 
Source:  http://www.peakprosperity.com/dailydigest/84905/daily-digest-34-californias-600-billion-sinkhole-lingering-
us-winter-and-ukrainian 
 
Even though the EU-Russia relation is of mutual advantage, each part essentially pursues its 
own national interest. Russia seeks long term contracts to supply European countries with gas and 
oil, while the EU demands Russia to respect the rules of free market and competition, and also those 
of human rights and democracy. This is difficult to achieve when your business partner is Russia 
governed by the current leadership. Vladimir Putin’s Russia seems to be a nostalgic of the imperial  
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era,  and  the  energy  card  is  the  only  instrument  of  survival  in  the  new  world  order  of  the 
globalization.  
 Some EU member states, like Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia or Finland, are 100% dependent on 
Russian gas, while Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Greece, Czech Republic or Austria import over 50% 
of  their  need  from  Russia,  others  importing  in  a  lesser  proportion,  but  enough  to  create  a 
dependence. The EU perceives its relationship with Russia as one of symbiosis, Poland’s foreign 
minister Radoslaw Sikorski declaring that “Moscow needs our money” (Die Spiegel, March 2014). 
From Russia’s point of view, it seems to be an energetic competition, Russia trying to prove that if 
Vladimir Putin sneezes, the whole Europe freezes1. Furthermore, Russia is not abiding by the 3 rd 
energy liberalization package. This forced the European Commission to announce that 6 contracts 
with EU member states and Serbia are not according to European Union’s legislation and must be 
renegotiated. 
In these conditions, the European Union has undertaken a series of well calculated measures 
which are addressed to reducing the energetic dependence on Russia..  
One of these alternatives is the import of gas either from the Middle East or from the Caspian 
Sea region. This alternatives would be viable only after 2019, when the construction of the Trans-
Adriatic pipe will be finished. Through this pipe, Europe will have access to 10 billion cubic meters 
of natural gas, each year, from Azerbaijan (Barroso, June 2013). 
Another solution is the Europe 2020 Strategy, which sets the priorities of the energetic policy 
until 2020, and presents the measure to be taken in order to stand up to the challenges linked to 
reducing energy consumption and securing energy supply at a competitive price.  
Studies show that if Europe 2020 Strategy objectives are reached, the EU member states could 
save 60 billion euro until 2020, money that could be used to develop new technologies for green 
energy sector and could create 600.000 jobs, supplemented by another 400.000 jobs if the energy 
efficiency indicatory is reached (Europe 2020 in a nutshell, 2012). 
Liquefied natural gas (LNG) represents another solution taken into account by the member 
states, being mentioned in the development strategy of various countries2.  
Importing energy from the US could be another alternative, taken into account at the EU.-US 
summit in March 2014, when leaders of the two superpowers revitalized talks concerning energetic 
security and trans-Atlantic trade, amid the escalation of conflict in Crimea. Importing gas from the 
                                                 
1This happened in 2009, when Gazprom shut down the gas on Ukraine, provoking negative effects for many European 
countries, as most of the pipes that supply Europe pass through Ukraine. 
2Lithuania and Poland are taking actions in this regard, building facilities and other infrastructure items, so they can 
import LNG from Qatar, United States of America (US), Australi a or Norway can be other suppliers. Also Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Ukraine support this idea (Andrei Radu, March 2014).  
CES Working Papers –Volume VI, Issue 2A 
  49 
United States of America became possible after the shale gas revolution, after combining 2 different 
mining technics: horizontal drilling and fracking.  
This  American  revolution  will  have  global  consequences,  redrawing  energy  supply  lines, 
turning the US from the biggest energy consumer to one of the most important energy suppliers in 
the world. This competition will have an effect on prices and the winners of this competition will be 
the biggest consumers: EU and China. A hindering factor will be the additional transport price and 
the lack of infrastructure for this type of imports. 
In their article “America’s Energy Edge”, Robert D. Blackwill and Meghan L. O’Sullivan 
(March 2014) state that in this new order Russia will be the most affected, even though it has vast 
oil  and  gas  resources,  because  the  geopolitical  advantage  of  owning  energetic  resources  will 
diminish. The biggest winner of the shale gas revolution will be Europe, which will have multiple 
suppliers and also a stronger position in the future EU-Russia negotiations.  
As written above, alternatives to Russian gas exists, and the EU is making a considerable 
effort to put them in practice. But to reach these targets, time and financial resources are needed.  
 
3.2 Commercial ties 
 
After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian economy began a transformation process since 
the beginning of the 2000’s. The new leader, Vladimir Putin, built the new economic system around 
Russia’s vast gas and oil reserves. This way, Russia took advantage of the lack of energy resources 
in Europe to become the most important supplier of oil and gas. 
As pointed out in figure 1, 12 out of 28 European countries, all of them from Eastern and 
Northern Europe, import more than 50% of their natural gas consumption from Russia. This aspect 
underlines that Russia has an upper hand as far as the commercial ties are concerned. Speaking 
strictly in numbers, it may seem so. Considering the importance of energy in today’s world, Russia 
seems  to  have  a  geostrategic  advantage  over  EU.  But  if  we  analyse  in  a  thorough  way  the 
commercial trade between these actors, we see a different image. 
According to the European Commission’s report from July 2013, the EU countries import 
from Russia mainly fuels (Petroleum and petroleum products represent 65% of Russian export to 
EU countries), no other product group surpassing 8% of Russian export towards EU.  
The same report emphasizes that the EU exports towards Russia consist of equipment and 
products,  inter  alia  agricultural  products  (11.4%),  8.5%  of  which  represents  food,  chemicals 
(15.8%), especially pharmaceuticals (6.4%), machinery and transport equipment (49.6%), which  
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includes,  among  others,  telecommunication  and  electronic  data  processing  equipment   (12%), 
automotive products (14.3), and non-electrical machinery (16.5). 
 
Table 2 - European Union trade with Russia 
Product Groups  Imports  Exports 
  Value (Mio €)  Share in total (%)  Value (Mio €)  Share in total (%) 
TOTAL  212,882  100.0  123,016  100.0 
Primary products  173,532  81.5  14,032  11.4 
 -Agricultural products  4,197  2.0  11,694  9.5 
  --Food  2,033  1.0  10,489  8.5 
                ---of which Fish  349  0.2  215  0.2 
             --Raw materials  2.164  1.0  1,205  1.0 
 -Fuels and mining products  169.335  79.5  2,339  1.9 
  --Ores and other minerals  1,702  0.8  453  0.4 
  --Fuels  162,448  76.3  1,395  1.1 
   ---of which Petroleum and 
petroleum products 
138,964  65.3  1,345  1.1 
  --Non ferrous metals 5,186  5,186  2.4  491  0.4 
Manufactures  17,096  8.0  107,261  87.2 
 -Iron and Steel  4,393  2.1  1,620  1.3 
 -Chemicals  6,276  3.0  19,412  15.8 
  --of which Pharmaceuticals  34  0.0  7,806  6.4 
 -Other semi-manufatures  3,898  1.8  9,490  7.7 
 -Machinery and transport equipment  1,970  0.9  61,035  49.6 
  --Office and telecommunication 
equipment 
102  0.1  8,169  6.6 
   ---Electronic data processing and 
office equipment 
25  0.0  3,888  3.2 
   ---Telecommunications equipment  59  0.0  3,941  3.2 
   ---Integrated circuits and electronic 
components 
18  0.0  341  0.3 
  --Transport equipment  742  0.4  23,434  19.1 
   ---of which Automotive products  66  0.0  17,548  14.3 
  --Other machinery  1,125  0.5  29,270  23.8 
   ---Power generating machinery  592  0.3  1,777  1.4 
   ---Non electrical machinery  253  0.1  20,273  16.5 
   ---Electrical machinery  280  0.1  7,220  5.9 
 -Textiles  47  0.0  1,088  0.9 
 -Clothing  22  0.0  3,410  2.8 
 -Other manufactures  491  0.2  11,177  9.1 
  --of which Scientific and controlling 
intruments 
172  0.1  3,198  2.6 
Other products  5,922  2.8  1,095  0.9 
Source: European Commission, European Union, Trade in goods with Russia, p. 6. 
 
According to the above table, Russia’s export comprises primary products, especially natural 
resources, while EU offers high technological equipment and products. This means that EU has a 
clear technological advantage, whereas Russia focuses mainly on exporting raw materials.  
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The aforementioned data point out that Russia is still a developing economy, characterised by 
little competitiveness, highly dependent on its trade with EU. A potential break in the EU -Russia 
commercial ties would mean a severe collapse for Russia. Hence, Russia’s geostrategic advantage 
towards the EU seems to lose its strength. 
Apart from being Russia’s main trading partner, the EU is also the biggest foreign investor in 
Russia. However, the member states are not investing evenly in Russia, the most important investor 
in the eastern country being Germany. In 2013, commercial ties between Germany and Russia rose 
to 77 billion euro (Hesse, Neubacher, Neukirch, Pauly, Reiermann and Schepp, 2014)1. 
All in all, we can see that the commercial ties create interdependent relations, a disruption of 
which  could lead to an economic crisis in Russia. Business analysts from Oxford Economics 
estimate that an embargo on 80% of the gas and oil sales would lead to a 10% contraction of the 
GDP by the end of 2015, while the Eurozone GDP would decline with 1.5% in th e same period 
(Euronews, 2014). 
It is expected that this commercial relation will experience a twist, as the shale gas revolution 
is expanding in Europe and other parts of the world, putting pressure on gas and oil prices. 
 
3.3 Frozen conflicts 
 
Russia considers that its influence in Eastern Europe, especially in former soviet states, is 
under threat, both by the EU policy and the increase of US’s sphere of influence. For this purpose, 
Russia supports, if not fabricates, artificial conflicts, the so-called “frozen conflicts”. 
A frozen conflict is an armed conflict which gets in an irresolute balance, not peace-not war, 
consequence  of  a  military  superiority  of  the  minority  group,  with  external  help,  and  the 
independence of the minority group is not recognized, violating the international law (Tocci, 2007, 
p.2). 
As Zbigniew Brzezinsky argued at the Globsec 2013 (Bratislava Global Security Forum), “the 
neighbour from the East is a large post-imperial state profoundly confused by its own illusions and 
nostalgias  and  with  its  leadership  still  yearning  for  superpower  status  and  subordination  of  its 
former provinces, especially Ukraine and Belarus – and possibly Georgia”. 
To maintain former soviet republics under its influence, Russia fuelled separatist movements 
in  Republic of Moldova, Azerbaijan,  Georgia, conflicts  which led to  de facto  separatist  states, 
                                                 
1In the light of the last events in Ukraine, and as the European Union considers an option to adopt economic sanctions 
against Russia, the German corporate representatives claim that at least 300.000 jobs are threatened if such sanctions are 
to be put into force, as 6.000 German companies are having some kind of activity in Russia. (Hesse et al., 2014). 
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unrecognized  by  the  international  community,  like  Transnistria,  Nagorno -Karabah,  Abkhazia  or 
South Ossetia. The most dangerous aspect of these frozen conflicts is that they can heat up at any 
moment, as the Georgian episode proved us. This conflict was not new, existing since the beginning 
of the 90’s (The Economist, 2009).  
The involvement of the European Union in the former Soviet states from Eastern Europe and 
Southern Caucasus puts pressure on Russia, which seeks to keep EU and NATO at bay. But Putin is 
assuming that EU or NATO will refuse a country with territorial or sovereignty problems The 
accession of Cyprus to European Union points out the contrary.  
The dominance of Russia in the Eastern neighbourhood is more than obvious. Russia has a 
military,  economic  and  cultural  advantage  in  this  area  (Korosteleva,  2012,  p.  116),  while  the 
European Union just starts to become appealing for citizens who desire to embrace democratic 
values. 
Until  now,  Europe  and  the  US  have  not  managed  to  offer  viable  alternatives  to  Russian 
menace over the former soviet states. An Eastern Partnership, or a visa liberalization treaty are still 
not able to contain the Russian threat (Cornell, 2014). This means that both the US and the EU 
should alter their approach and strategies, in order to stand against any future Russian aggression. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The relationship between EU and Russia cannot be defined strictly and totally as a symbiosis 
or as a competition. Depending on the field where the battle is being held, the relationship changes 
its nature. On one hand, at an ideological level it is a confrontation. The EU is trying to establish 
itself as a normative power in the Eastern region by sustaining actions that help the development of 
the civil society and democratic institutions, whereas Russia undermines these kind of actions by 
controlling the elites and the media. On the other hand, the symbiosis is to be observed when 
regarding the energetic and commercial ties, even though geostrategic, Russia is becoming more 
and more dependent. 
 
.  
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